This paper develops a model of environmental resource use in production with an empirical analysis of how electric power companies consume and bank sulfur dioxide pollution permits. The model considers emissions, fuels, and labor as variable inputs with quasi-fixed inputs of permits and capital. Incorporating information from permit markets allows us to distinguish between user costs and asset shadow values. Our findings indicate that firms are holding stocks of pollution permits for reasons other than short-term cost savings. The results also reveal substantial substitution possibilities between emissions, permits stocks, and other factors of production. We speculate that anticipated secondary markets for carbon-offset inventories related to the flexibility mechanisms of the Kyoto Protocol will have similar effects for greenhouse-gas emitting firms. Tables   Table 1: Permit allowances held in various accounts in thousands, 1996-2001 ____________ 31 output, 1995-1999 _______ 31 
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The Environment as a Factor of Production
All economic activity involves either the direct or indirect use of common property environmental resources that are transformed from a natural state to some degraded condition via emissions. Ayers and Kneese (1969) developed the material balance principle to measure this transformation, arguing that material inputs should be defined broadly to include water and air in addition to fuels and conventional material inputs. Van den Bergh (1999) argues that neoclassical production functions are not necessarily inconsistent with mass balances, but empirical models of cost and production often do not provide adequate information to fully understand input substitution possibilities to improve the environment. This study attempts to fill this void by developing a model that includes capital, labor, energy, and material inputs, along with environmental resources as factors of production.
To a considerable extent, firms already consider the environment in their production activities, usually in response to regulation induced by the inefficient allocation of environmental resources arising from market failure. In some cases, governments create markets for permits or allowances to consume these environmental resources more efficiently. With a market for pollution permit allowances, firms equate their marginal costs of abatement, collectively generating an equilibrium market price for permits as they allocate factor inputs to minimize production costs. In equilibrium, the marginal cost of pollution abatement equals the marginal benefit of avoided environmental damages, consistent with the societal consensus reflected in the statutory permit allocation. Hence, the equilibrium permit price is essentially a price for emissions, which is equivalent to the consumption of environmental resources.
The permit market for sulfur dioxide (SO 2 ) emissions in the United States is often cited as a blueprint for developing markets for allowances to emit greenhouse gases. Under this system, regulators allocate permits to meet an industry-wide emissions target. Though the permit system requires firms to consume a permit for every unit of pollution emitted, firms can adjust their emissions to minimize cost based on the price of permits relative to the marginal cost of reducing emissions. Several studies, including Tietenberg (1990) and Carlson et al. (2000) , demonstrate that these trading systems improve efficiency over uniform emissions standards.
Firms with relatively high pollution control costs can avoid these expenses by purchasing excess permits generated by firms with relatively lower pollution abatement costs. Profits gained from permit sales provide incentives to substitute inputs or adopt new technology to cut emissions.
Another flexible feature of the U.S. SO 2 pollution permit-trading program is that firms can bank emission allowances for future use. Stocks of allowances are likely to be valuable because future regulations, output, emissions, and technology are uncertain, and the penalties are high for emissions that are unmatched with allowances. For example, if a firm underestimates sales, they can use stored pollution permits to increase output. Likewise, uncertainty about the efficiency of pollution control equipment may induce firms to adopt a wait-and-see attitude and to keep a stock of allowances if emission control costs become too high. Additionally, the uncertainty of future regulation of emission levels could motivate firms to bank permits, even if current prices exceed those for future delivery. Stocks of permits, therefore, are assets that generate a flow of benefits over time, much as Ramey (1989) has shown for inventories. This paper captures the stock and flow dimensions of pollution permit use with a model of U.S. fossil-fuel electric power generation cost that makes the distinction between the short-run, when capital and permit stocks are fixed, and the long-run, when all inputs are allowed to vary. Our empirical analysis involves estimation of a short-run restricted cost function that estimates substitution between low and high sulfur fuels, labor and maintenance, and emissions, given these input prices and predetermined levels of output, capital, and permit stocks.
Equilibrium levels of permit stocks and capital are imputed by solving the long-run equilibrium conditions that equate user costs with shadow values. In the short run, the difference between user costs and shadow values may reflect transactions costs, uncertainty premiums, or firm characteristics.
Our model differs from many studies employing marginal abatement cost functions because no strong assumptions about the nature of production and the environment are required, such as strong or weak separability between emissions and other factors of production. 1 In laying a foundation for econometric analysis, our framework also allows empirical estimation of the determinants of the demand for environmental pollution permits, including output, relative input prices, and non-price induced or biased technical change. As of this writing, there are no other empirical studies employing structural econometric estimation of firm behavior under emissions trading.
The next section of this paper provides a brief background on the SO 2 trading program and market performance. Section two of the paper provides a synopsis of recent studies of the economics of emissions banking, providing a basis for the theoretical model developed in section three. The formulation of the econometric model appears in section four. The features of the 1 Obviously, the marginal abatement cost framework was necessary prior to the advent of permit trading. sample and related econometric issues are discussed in section five. The sixth section presents estimates of short and long-run demand and substitution elasticities of input use, emissions, and permit demand. The paper concludes with a discussion of the policy implications of the findings.
I. The Allowance Trading System
Title IV of the 1990 U.S. Clean Air Act Amendments (CAAA) mandates a 10 million ton reduction in SO 2 emissions from 1980 emission levels for fossil-fueled-fired power plants. The ATS provides the allowance market with a record of the identity of the permit holder and the date and the number of allowances transferred. The ATS does not, however, record the price or other terms associated with allowance trades. Submitting allowance transfers to EPA is voluntary and the unit is not required to report a transaction until it actually uses the allowances. 4 There are also a very small number of industrial boilers that are allowed to "opt-in" Title IV.
An overview of permit holding in these categories and others appears in Table 1 . The reported permit stocks in Table 1 are observed for specific dates when EPA reconciles emissions with allowances. Banked allowances -equal to total allowances held less emissions, steadily increased during Phase I from more than 3.4 million in 1996 to more than 9.6 million during 1999 with a majority of permits held for Table A Table 1 ). The sharp increase in allocations during 1996, again reflected in 1997 (see Table 1 ), may reflect the idiosyncratic nature of allocations in early years due to special provisions under Title IV. These anomalies suggest that permit stock holding, particularly at the firm level, may reflect a number of institutional factors in addition to economic incentives.
Firms or speculators can purchase permits during EPA auctions for a small number of allowances. The intent of the auctions is to ensure that new units have an allowance source beyond the initial allocation to existing units. Another motivation for holding the auctions was to facilitate price determination during the early stages of the program. Since then, however, the SO 2 permit market has rapidly evolved with a sophisticated trading network.
Private trading of permits between electric utilities and/or utilities and brokers is the principal mechanism of price discovery. Prior to 1993, the market largely consisted of bilateral trades usually without brokers or with brokers operating similar to investment bankers. Cantor Fitzgerald established a commodity spot market for allowances in 1993, leading to a more than 50 percent increase in intra-utility trading by the end of Phase I. As of March 2000, about 75 million allowances were traded through private transactions, constituting more than half the cumulative trading volume in the market at that time (Bartels, 1997) . In addition to Cantor Fitzgerald, Emissions Exchange Corporation (EX) and Evolution Markets also publish allowance prices on bids to buy and offers to sell for current vintages of permits, with an average of these bids defined as the spot market price for allowances. Also listed by these brokerages are the immediate settlement prices of allowances for future vintages. A vintage year t+T allowance is unusable until year t+T. Thus, immediate settlement transactions in year t involving allowances with vintage greater than the current year can be thought of as a T year forward contract with the date of settlement being the vintage year. Price, quantity, and settlement date (today) are agreed upon by the two parties. Transfer of allowances and money occur at the date of sale. The price on these transactions is essentially a discounted forward price (Bartels, 1997).
A plot of spot prices and forward price spreads for SO 2 allowances appears in Figure 1 .
Notice that spread between forward and spot prices is often negative or backwardated. The marginal cost of abating a ton of SO 2 from the utility sector was initially estimated at $400-1000/ton prior to passage of the Clean Air Act Amendments. During 2000, however, SO 2 allowances ranged in price from $130/ton to $155/ton (see Figure 1 ). Some market observers believe lower than expected allowances prices during the early years of the program were due primarily to lower than expected compliance costs and larger than expected emissions reductions, which have increased the supply of allowances and put downward pressure on prices.
Ellerman and Montero (1998) perform an econometric analysis of the pre-CAAA period and conclude that lower delivered price for low-sulfur coal due in part to economies of scale in rail transportation caused the total and marginal cost of compliance curves to shift downwards, thereby causing lower than expected allowance prices.
By several measures, the SO 2 trading program has been successful. Schmalensee, et al. (1998) report that during the first five years of the program, emissions declined substantially, driven in large part by a switch to low-sulfur coal from the Powder River Basin in Wyoming.
During 1995 and 1996, emissions were 39 and 33 percent, respectively, below allowances issues in those years.
The characteristic feature of a cap and trade program is the immense flexibility in compliance that it offers. Electric utilities under the CAAA program face an array of choices to comply with EPA regulations. Some of the options available include fuel-switching, fuelblending, installation of scrubbers, allowance trading, reducing/switching generation at the units, retrofitting the unit, producing less output, and shutting down inefficient units. The incidence of scrubbing among Phase I units has increased very little since 1996. There are many reasons for this, including high capital costs of scrubbers, prevalence of long-term fuel contracts, and decreasing prices of midwestern low-sulfur coal. Fuel blending and switching and allowance purchases represent the majority of the compliance methods. The exact delineation of these two methods is somewhat complicated as many units choose a mixture of both depending the balance between fuel constraints and allowance prices. While the model estimated below abstracts from these details, it provides insights into their relative importance by measuring factor substitution elasticities.
II. Economics of Emissions Permit Banking
Another source of flexibility is permit banking, which allows firms to shift emissions over time. Many studies examine gains achieved from emissions trading between firms and from emissions averaging between sources within a firm, but relatively few focus on the economics of emissions trading for the firm. Rubin (1996) develops a continuous-time model of emissions trading, permit banking, and borrowing. He shows that trading results in an efficient allocation of permits that collectively minimizes cost. When permit stocks are positive and the nonnegativity constraint on permits is not binding, the rate of change in the price of emissions follows a simple Hotelling rule, rising at the rate of interest. When the non-negativity constraint is binding, the shadow value of permit stocks is positive and marginal abatement costs rise at a rate less than the rate of interest. Using a similar model, Cronshaw and Kruse (1996) find that abatement costs may not be minimized if firms are subject to profit regulation because permit sales and purchases are treated differently for rate-making purposes.
Kling and Rubin (1997) use an optimal control framework to model permit banking decisions under perfect foresight. They find that, in equilibrium, marginal abatement costs equal permit prices and that permit price growth over time follows Hotelling's rule. They differentiate these conditions with respect to time and develop equilibrium paths for emissions and production that are functions of second derivatives of the cost function, which depends upon output, emissions, and disembodied technological change. Firms have incentives to bank permits when marginal abatement costs are rising, marginal production costs are falling, emission standards are increasing, or output prices are rising. They find that in many cases firms sub-optimally overproduce and pollute in early periods because firms, in their view, consider the stock of permits as a fixed endowment. Schennach (1999) The economic model developed below is inspired by Carlson, et al. (2000) with two important differences: emissions are a variable input and permit stocks are a quasi-fixed factor of production.
Ayres and Kneese (1969) showed that the amount of environmental pollutants should approximately equal the weight of energy and raw materials inputs, which would include minerals, water, air, and other common property resources. This mass balance approach, further developed by Ayers (1978) and Ayers (1999) , suggests the following production function for electric power generation:
where Y is output, F is fuel inputs, L is labor and maintenance, K is capital services, and E represents environmental inputs, such as air, water, and other common property resources. Dual to this production function is a cost function:
where C is the cost of producing output Y, and the w's are prices of the four factors of production. In most cases, prices for environmental inputs are unavailable absent trading of marketable pollution permit allowances. If these input prices are available, then this analysis suggests that one could estimate a cost function considering the consumption of environmental resources, which is equivalent to emissions, as a variable factor of production. 6 Under competitive market conditions, the market-clearing price for pollution permits would serve as a good proxy for the marginal emissions factor cost. Given the assumption of a twice continuously differentiable cost function, the demand for emissions is equal to the first partial derivative of cost with respect to the permit price.
Another dimension of pollution permits is storability for future use. Hence, the bank of tradable permits is an asset. In this case, the short run is defined as a time period when the stock of banked permits is fixed. 
subject to:
where t P is output price in period t, t A is the allotment of permits given to the firm by the regulator, G is a short run restricted cost function with three variable input categories -fuel, labor, and environmental resources, and two quasi-fixed factor inputs, capital -t K and the allowances banked by the firm at the end of period t, t B ; t Q represents net permit purchases, k µ is the user cost of capital, and b µ is the user cost of holding banked permits. Ending stocks of pollution permits by definition equal carryover stocks from the previous period plus the annual allocation granted by regulators plus net purchases less emissions. Note that permit purchases, t Q , is positive if firms are net buyers and negative if net sellers.
Assuming output is predetermined, minimizing cost provides a solution to the above profit maximization problem with cost minimizing variable factor input levels given by Shephard's lemma. The short-run demand functions for fuel, labor and maintenance, and emissions are given by:
The long-run envelop-conditions for the bank of pollution permit allowances and capital are as follows:
With predetermined permit allocations and carryover permit stocks, the model can be solved for permit purchases from the variable emissions demand function and the condition for ending stocks of permits.
The user cost of capital is defined as the price of new generation capacity multiplied by the real rate of return, which is an asset-weighted average of bond and equity rates less the rate of inflation. The user cost of permits is defined as follows:
where t r is real rate of return on capital, et P is the price of permits at the end of period t, and f et P is the forward price of permits for period t+1 and beyond in period t. 7 Unlike capital, a dynamic user cost is adopted for permits because firms can sell and buy back permits at much lower transactions costs. Hence, the user cost of holding permits includes the financial opportunity cost of holding of permits net of the expected capital gain (loss) earned on permit holdings. This specification of user costs together with the condition (7) for permit stocks is consistent with the futures market arbitrage condition described by Brealey and Myers (2003) in which futures prices net of transactions costs reflect the future value of spot prices and the convenience yield from holding permit stocks:
where the last partial derivative corresponds with the convenience yield from holding permits. 8
In the short run, however, these envelope conditions may not hold for a variety of reasons. For capital, rate of return regulations may drive a wedge between user cost and the shadow value of capital. Adjustment costs, discussed by Morrison (1988) , are another reason for short-run disequilibrium in capital stocks. A similar disequilibrium is also possible for pollution permit stocks due to transactions costs and uncertainty. The following section describes a method for modeling these disequilibrium effects by firm.
7 Prices in the permit user costs are measured when EPA reconciles the permit accounts in either January or March of each year. The price for emissions used in the variable input demand functions is an annual average. In addition, the real rate of return contains an implicit risk premium, which is reflected in equity and bond rates of return and consistent with Schennach's model (1999) . 8 Futures prices are often very close to forward prices where the former are marked to market.
IV. Econometric Formulation
The Generalized Leontief (GL) function developed by Morrison (1988) is best suited for this particular problem because Caves and Christensen (1980) found it more likely to maintain cost minimizing curvature conditions under limited input substitution possibilities, which is a reasonable prior assumption for electric power generation. Another important reason is that the GL provides a closed-form solution for stocks of quasi-fixed factors, which facilities computation of long-run elasticities. For this particular problem, the GL takes the following form: 
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The envelope condition provides an expression that equates the marginal user cost of holding permits with the shadow value of permits: 
A similar equation exists for capital: 
The full model then includes four short-run demand equations and two quasi-fixed factor equations, one for permit stocks and the other for capital.
Since utilities are the agents making decisions about allowance use, aggregate data at the operating-utility or holding company level best illustrates banking behavior (Ellerman, et al, 2000) . For our panel data set, we assume the following fixed effects for the error terms:
, , , ; 1,..., ; 1,..., Given that the envelope conditions for quasi-fixed factors do not include intercept terms, the fixed effects in these equations represent a wedge between user costs and shadow values.
Rate of return regulation is a likely reason for divergence between the user cost and shadow value of capital. The fixed effect in the permit stock equation essentially measures the departure of each firm's marginal valuation of stocks from the market returns to storage. There may be many reasons for these departures, including diverse regulatory policies, transactions costs, or the uncertainty premium identified by Schennach (1999) . Another reason could involve option values from holding stocks of pollution permits to avoid severe financial penalties from not having enough permits on hand to cover emissions at the end of the year or from banking permits to smooth production or cost in future years in response to tighter emission controls or regulatory and market uncertainty.
For pollution permit stock holding during Phase I of the acid rain program, it is likely that the uncertainty premium varied over time. At the start of Phase I, many companies simply did not know how successful the program would be and, therefore, did not have complete knowledge of the desired stock of permits. As Phase II approached and the success of fuel switching, lower sulfur scrubbing costs, and other measures to satisfy the emission requirements became evident, the degree of uncertainty diminished. This suggests that the uncertainty premium during Phase I diminished over time. To test this hypothesis, the fixed effect in the permit stock equations is amended to include a term that is a function of the years to Phase II. Accordingly, the permit stock condition becomes:
where T is the year in either the start of Phase II ( 1999 Phase II T = ), or year t. The last two terms in (15) represent the net transactions cost and uncertainty premium for firm j. The expectation is that 0 φ > so that as uncertainty diminishes during Phase I, the disequilibrium wedge gets
smaller. The full model includes six equations given by (12), (13), and (15) estimated using observations on costs, output, and factor prices for a sample of firms operating under Phase I.
V. Sample and Estimation Issues
The Summary statistics for output and input costs are presented in Table 2 . On average, output is 22.4 million megawatt hours with a substantial standard deviation due to the inclusion of Southern Company and American Electric Power. Fuel costs average 1.5 cents per kilowatt hour (see Table 2 ). High sulfur fuel dominates fuel costs for these Phase I firms. Labor and maintenance costs are the next largest variable input. Emissions costs are miniscule, although like the other cost components: there is a large dispersion with a maximum value of 0.39 cents per kilowatt. Like emissions, permit holding costs -which are the product of user costs and permit stock levels, are a small fraction of total costs. Total costs, including permit and capital costs, average slightly over 3 cents per kilowatt hour.
The data on unit emissions and permit stock holding by firm were collected from the Allowance Tracking System, aggregated from the generation unit level up to the plant and eventually firm level. Summary statistics for the permit balances are presented in Table 3 . On average, firms held permits equivalent to 79,000 tons of emissions at $150 per ton -$11.8 million. Average permit allocations from EPA were somewhat more than double permit stock levels (see Table 3 ). Net purchases, calculated using equation (5), are negative indicating that firms on average were net sellers of permits during Phase I of the program. Presumably, firms sold these permits to speculators other than the Phase I firms.
There are several estimation issues that arise with this model. First, permit stocks are clearly endogenous given (5). Output and input prices, particularly high sulfur fuel prices, also may be endogenous. Several firms, particularly the large ones, are major buyers of high sulfur coal and, thus, could influence market prices through their purchasing patterns and contracting strategies. Moreover, firms may adjust output in response to pollution permit policies. So an instrumental variable estimator is required. According to Shea (1993) , selection of instruments should be made on the basis of correlation with the right-hand side variables and on whether the instruments are exogenous with the explanatory variables in the model, which include relative prices, beginning capital stocks, output, trend, and ending stocks of allowances. A good instrument for ending permit stocks is allocations with a simple correlation of 0.74. Lagged relative prices, lagged output, and a dummy variable for deregulation are used as the other instrumental variables. Using the information compiled by Lile and Burtraw (1998), two additional instrumental variables were created, one for the presence of high sulfur coal deposits for utilities operating in each state and another for the presence of automatic pass-through and incentive-based sharing of allowance costs. The last instrumental variable is the number of years before Phase II. The other estimation issue involves inefficiency introduced from the possible presence of heteroscedasticity, which is likely given the large dispersion in output and levels of quasi-fixed factors. As a result, the estimates reported below use the generalized method of moments, which is an asympototically efficient, instrumental variables estimator.
VI. Empirical Findings
With relatively short time series, the trend terms and output are highly correlated, which prevents identifying the separate effects of returns to scale and non-neutral technological change on cost and input substitution. Most previous studies of electric power generation reject constant returns to scale, generally finding increasing returns. Accordingly, the subsequent analysis allows variable returns to scale and compares two models, the unconstrained model and the model with neutral technological change.
The product of the objective function and the number of observations provides a test of the over-identifying conditions of the model. For the unconstrained model, the test statistic is 96.3 with a probability value of 23.8 percent. This test suggests that the over-identifying restrictions cannot be rejected. Using the same set of instruments, the test statistic for the model with neutral technical change is 96.0 with a probability value of 44.3. The difference between these two statistics is 0.3 with a probability value of 99 percent. Hence, the hypothesis of neutral technological change cannot be rejected. 10 Based upon these results, neutral technological change is adopted as a maintained hypothesis. In this case, the model is re-estimated with the instrumental variables excluding those involving trend. For this model, the test statistic for the overidentifying restrictions is 73.5
with a probability value of 46.1 percent, which suggests that these restrictions cannot be rejected.
The summary fit statistics appears in Table 4 . With the exception of the permit stock equation, the correlations between the predicted and actual dependent variables are quite high. Moreover, the Durbin-Watson statistics and the probability levels indicate a relatively good chance that errors in most of the equations are uncorrelated with their adjacent values in each panel.
All own-price elasticities of demand are negative and the concavity and convexity conditions are satisfied at the sample mean. The shadow value on capital is negative with a probability value of 7.1 percent. The partial derivative of cost with respect to permit stocks is -1.8, which is only 1.4 percent of the $132 average permit price over the sample, and the probability value indicates an 80 percent chance that the estimate is not significantly different from zero. In contrast, 17 of the 36 fixed effects in the permit equation are significant at the one percent level and another 11 are significant at the five percent level. The coefficient on the years to Phase II variable, φ , reported in Table 5 is positive as expected and significant. 11 A plot of the distribution of the disequilibrium terms for each firm from equation (15) The average wedge, which represents the combination of transactions costs and uncertainty premium, across the 36 firms is 9 percent with a standard deviation of 6.1 percent. 12 Joskow and Schmalensee (1998) note that the average commission per allowance trade in 1996 was less than 2% of the prevailing spot price for SO 2 allowances. 13 This suggests that firms on average are willing to pay a 7 percent uncertainty premium from holding pollution permits. These results suggest that uncertainty and perhaps other fixed effects are relatively more important than a convenience yield from short-run variable cost savings earned from holding pollution permit stocks. Table 6 contains the estimated short-run price elasticities of demand. The only short-run input that significantly responds to output is high sulfur fuel, which fuels the bulk of base-load power generation. Permit stocks significantly affect the demand for fuels. Higher permit stocks, for instance, shift out the demand curve for low-sulfur fuel and decrease the demand for highsulfur fuel. This finding reflects the accumulation of permit stocks and the shift from high to low sulfur fuels observed during the sample. Also, higher permit stocks increase the demand for emissions, with a probability level of 6.5 percent. The partial effects of capital are significant with higher capital stocks, ceteris paribus, significantly reducing the demand for emissions, labor, and maintenance.
Another question is whether substitution possibilities between the environment and other factors of production are any greater or less than other factor input substitutions. For this question, a unit-less measure of substitution is needed. The analysis by Blackorby and Russell (1989) proves that the Morishima elasticity is a superior measure of substitution. This is particularly important for this study because it provides a clear distinction between substitutions induced by permit prices versus other input price changes. Morishima elasticities are defined as follows:
These elasticities measure the curvature of an isoquant, or the percentage change in a factor input ratio for a given percentage change in price, holding all other factor prices constant. As the above equation illustrates, the effect of varying i w on the factor input ratio, i j x x , is composed of two parts -the effect of i w on i x and the effect of i w on j x . Blackorby and Russell (1989) show that these elasticities are inherently asymmetric.
The estimated short-run Morishima elasticities of substitution appear in Table 7 . Ten out of the twelve substitution elasticities are significant at the five percent level. Substitutability dominates even in the short-run, when stocks of permits and capital are fixed. As expected, high-sulfur fuel and emissions are estimated complements, but the elasticity is insignificant.
Across the columns of Table 7 , the elasticities of factor input ratios are substantially larger for low-sulfur fuel than they are for other price changes. For instance, the ratio of high-sulfur fuel to low-sulfur fuel rises 2.57 percent for every percent increase in low sulfur fuel prices while the high sulfur fuel to emissions factor ratio responds 0.74 percent for a change in the emissions price. These finding suggest that relative fuel prices are relatively more important in factor substitution than changes in emissions prices in the short run.
The long-run elasticities allow permit and capital stocks to adjust with their respective user costs, prices for variable factors, and output. So, for example, as the price of emissions changes in the long-run, permit stocks change, which then shift the short-run demand curves.
The long-run elasticities are defined as follows:
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The second two terms in (16) measure the shift in the short-run demand curves as the product of the elasticity of the variable factor demand with respect to the quasi-fixed factor and the cross price elasticity between the quasi-fixed and variable factors. 14 The long-run price elasticities are presented in Table 8 . All long-run own-price elasticities of demand are negative, but only three are significant, low-sulfur fuel, wages and maintenance, and capital. The long-run demand for low-sulfur fuel is significantly affected by its own price and prices for labor and maintenance. Output is the only significant factor affecting high sulfur fuel demand in the longrun. The demand for labor and maintenance is significantly affected by its own price, prices for low-sulfur fuel and the user cost of capital. The estimated long-run demand elasticities for emissions reflect significant substitution with capital. As expected, high sulfur fuel and permit stocks are significant long-run complements. In contrast, low-sulfur fuel and permit stocks are significant long-run substitutes, also as expected. The cross elasticities of demand for capital indicate significant substitution of capital inputs in response to prices for labor and maintenance and emissions prices.
Finally, the long-run Morishima elasticities of substitution are presented in Table 9 .
Similar to the short-run substitution elasticities, low sulfur fuel prices significantly induce substitution among most factor input ratios, with the exception of high-sulfur fuel (see column 2
of Table 9 ). The price of high-sulfur fuel significantly affects the ratio of permit stocks to highsulfur fuel use. Wages and prices for maintenance also induce significant substitution for all factor inputs with the exception of permit stocks (column 4, Table 9 ). Emissions prices are significant in prompting long-run substitution between capital and emissions. The user cost of permits does not induce significant substitution between permits and all other factor inputs in the long-run. The user cost of capital, however, significantly induces substitution between capital and fuel, labor and maintenance, and emissions. Overall, these elasticities suggest considerable substitution possibilities between environmental resources, labor, capital, and energy.
VII. Conclusions
The SO 2 trading program in the United States provides a means for society to discover prices for emissions or the price society is willing to pay for avoiding damages from the consumption of common property resources, such as the atmosphere and other environmental resources. This paper applies a neoclassical cost model to examine substitution possibilities between the environment and other factors of production. With an efficient market for pollution allowances, permit prices provide an essential signal for resource allocation. Similarly, forward prices for permits provide firms with information for allocating permits over time.
Our econometric estimates suggest considerable substitution possibilities exist between environmental emissions, fuels, labor, and capital in electric power generation. In the short run with fixed stocks of permits and capital, changes in low sulfur fuel prices have the largest impacts on factor substitution. While emissions prices are significant, relative fuel prices in the short run are a relatively more important determinant of factor substitution than changes in emission permit prices. As stocks of capital and permits adjust in the long run, relative fuel prices continue to be the predominant force inducing factor substitution.
The results also indicate the presence of an uncertainty premium that justifies holding stocks of permits even in the presence of sizeable user costs. Prices for permits induce factor 
